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COVID-19 MISSTEPS

C O M M E N TA R Y

Missteps in Managing the
COVID-19 Crisis
by Joseph W. McDonnell

T

he COVID-19 pandemic touched
every corner of the world, infecting
and killing millions of people and robbing
many more millions of their livelihoods.
It is the most widespread and devastating
crisis of our lifetime. The pandemic
surprised the world with the speed of
its spread and caught nations woefully
unprepared to contain the virus. Many
world leaders failed to respond effectively
to the crisis even after it became apparent
that the pandemic posed a significant
threat to their countries and their people.
Although the pandemic took the
world by surprise, in hindsight its arrival
was readily predictable in a world where
we encroach on forests and wildlife habitats, engage in large-scale farming that
pack animals into crowded pens, house
millions of city dwellers in close quarters,
and ship millions of cargo containers and
move millions of people across borders
each year. In our globalized world, the
risk of a widespread infectious disease
outbreak had increased exponentially.
Epidemiologists long warned that only
the timing of the next pandemic remained
uncertain not its eventual arrival
(Osterholm and Olshaker 2020).
Why did the warning signs for
COVID-19 go unnoticed? Why did so
many leaders fail to plan for a pandemic?
And why did they not recognize the
outbreak and respond effectively even
after the pandemic was at their doorstep?
I will seek to answer these questions by
exploring six stages in crisis management:
(1) preventing the crisis, (2) planning for
the crisis, (3) recognizing the crisis, (4)
containing the crisis, (5) returning the
72

society to normal or to a noncrisis state,
and (6) learning from the crisis (Augustine
1995). As we undertake this exploration,
keep in mind that it’s much easier to
identify missteps than to manage a crisis
as it unfolds. But uncovering missteps is
the best way to help society prepare for
the next crisis.
MISSTEPS IN WUHAN CHINA

O

n December 30, 2019, Dr. Li
Wenliang, an ophthalmologist
in Wuhan, China, sent an online chat
to warn his medical school classmates
about a mysterious SARS-like illness that
had infected several patients who were
brought to the emergency room. Dr. Li
likely indicated the virus was spreading
from human to human and not just from
animals to people, meaning it was highly
contagious. If it spread only with direct
contact with animals, it would not be as
feared because fewer people have contact
with animals. Local Chinese government
officials chastised Dr. Li for spreading
such information and compelled him to
retract his statement. The doctor soon
after became sick with COVID-19 and
died, providing dramatic evidence of
the human transmission of the virus
(Buckley and Myers 2020).
In response to rumors that spread
rapidly over social media, the Wuhan
Municipal Health Commission was
forced to issue an urgent notice to city
hospitals about cases of atypical pneumonia linked to a wholesale seafood
market. The city indicated the disease was
preventable and controllable with no

need for public concern. Several days
later the city shut down the market. Over
the next several weeks, the number of
illnesses and deaths in Wuhan increased.
Local officials, though, persisted in
claiming that there was no human-tohuman transmission and the situation
was under control (CRS 2020).
In early January 2020, authorities in
Beijing sent teams of scientific experts to
Wuhan, but local officials likely stymied
the work of these experts to prevent them
from reaching a conclusion that the virus
was contagious. On January 7, 2020, the
Wuhan Institute of Virology completed a
genetic sequence of the novel coronavirus, and the World Health Organization
began developing a diagnostic test.
Finally, on January 18, Beijing sent a
third team, which included Dr. Zhong
Nanshan, the famed epidemiologist who
first diagnosed the SARS epidemic in
2003. One day later, the scientific team
reported its findings to the National
Health Commission. Dr. Zhong was
highly critical of the Wuhan government’s response. He said, “If the government had sent out a notice, if they had
asked everyone to wear masks, to do
temperature checks, maybe a lot fewer
people would have died” (Chen and
Cadell 2020).
Three days later, the central government in Beijing ordered the lockdown of
Wuhan and extended the lockdown to
the surrounding region—confining a
total of 56 million people to their homes
(Aljazeera 2020). Prior to the shutdown,
however, thousands of people travelled
from Wuhan to other parts of China and
abroad, spreading the virus. Soon after
being detected in China, the coronavirus
spread throughout Asia, to South Korea,
Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand,
and Vietnam. It also rapidly spread
outside Asia to Australia, Canada, the
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United States, and the largest countries in
Europe.
Shortly after China recognized the
severity of the crisis and took dramatic
action, it became clear that the virus had
traveled throughout the world and may
even have spread before being diagnosed
in China. In late January, the World
Health Organization declared a global
health emergency (BBC News 2020).
FAILURE TO LEARN FROM
PREVIOUS CRISES

T

here are several lessons in crisis
management that we can see from
the early stages of this case study. The first
lesson is to learn from previous crises to
take steps to prevent a similar crisis from
happening again.
In markets such as the one in Wuhan
where scientists believe the virus likely
originated, animals are often held in
confined spaces and small cages. This
setting can allow for the exchange and
mixing of multiple bodily fluids. Human
handling of these animals may also cause
viruses to spill over into the human population, especially if the handlers of these
wild animals have cuts, scratches, bites, or
other wounds from the animals (Phillips
2020). We do not know if preventing the
sale or consumption of wild animals or
closer monitoring of these markets would
have prevented this crisis, but such traditions may have to be rethought as urbanization and deforestation bring human
society and wild animals closer together.
A leak from the Wuhan Institute of
Virology has been postulated as an alternative theory of COVID-19’s origin.
Both virus origin theories remain speculative and are only supported by circumstantial evidence. Still, the same principle
of learning from past mistakes applies
equally to the animal transmission and
the lab-leak origination theory.

So why did China and so many
other countries not learn from previous
crises? And why did they not take action
to prevent and plan for this crisis?
Organizations fail to learn for many
reasons. New leaders come into organizations with new priorities and new challenges, and the old crises along with the
lessons learned get placed on the back
burner. Also, the time between similar
crises often leaves a false impression. In
the flu pandemic of 1918, approximately
5 percent of the world’s population
perished (Spinney 2017), but the
100-year time lapse could make leaders
think such a pandemic could not happen
again, and more recent pandemics have
been more readily contained.
Leaders may also prefer to take
actions that produce immediate benefits
rather than imposing unpopular policies
(such as the elimination of the sale of
wild animals in wet markets or restrictions on laboratory experiments) for
benefits that may not be seen for many
years if at all. It is easy to rationalize decisions to not devote scarce resources to
low-probability events. Unfortunately,
when high-impact, low-probability events
occur, they impinge on priorities and
disrupt societies.
FAILURE TO PLAN TO
MITIGATE THE CRISIS

The second lesson of crisis management is to plan for future crises to mitigate their effects. For a pandemic, such
measures would include developing a
master plan that coordinates agencies,
strengthens vulnerable supply chains,
and secures critical resources such as ICU
beds, ventilators, and personal protective
equipment (PPE) for medical workers.
The plan would be tested through
scenario or mock drills to stress test its
capability. The test would allow multiple
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organizations to practice coordination
and would reveal weaknesses in the
public health and medical systems and
supply chain that could be remedied
prior to an actual crisis.
In the COVID-19 crisis, every
country in the world was caught with an
inadequate supply of PPE and other
essential supplies. Many discovered their
public health and healthcare systems were
not up to the task of handling a pandemic.
Many countries had outsourced the
manufacture of PPE and generic pharmaceuticals to China and other low-cost
producers (Brader 2020); when China
shut down to prevent the spread of the
virus, the world suffered shortages of
essential supplies. Some countries quickly
remedied the shortfall while others did
not (Fisher and Hang-San 2020; Wieler
et al. 2020).
It’s the responsibility of governments, businesses, or organizations to
perform risk assessments to identify and
prepare for the most likely potential
crises. Risk is the relationship between
probabilities and impact. Quite often
when a crisis occurs we discover that we
missed the warning signs and miscalculated the risk. In hindsight, we discover
that every crisis had warning signs
although sometimes they are difficult to
detect. In light of other pandemics such
as SARS, MERS, Ebola, or H1N1,
should governments have anticipated this
pandemic? Or was COVID-19 a 100-year
event that could not have been
anticipated?
The answer to that question may
determine your conclusion about
missteps. If we consider this pandemic as
completely novel or unknown, we may
have more sympathy toward the poor
preparation by government leaders. But if
we look at COVID-19 as part of a
pattern of pandemics, then we may
73
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conclude that governments should have
anticipated, prevented, and planned for
the crisis.
RECOGNIZING AND
RESPONDING TO A CRISIS

The third lesson of crisis management is the challenge of recognizing a
crisis as it unfolds. In hindsight, it’s easy
to see the emergence of a crisis, but in real
time, it’s often quite difficult to sense the
severity or potential severity of an event.
There are many reasons why sensing
an emerging crisis is not easy. It could be
inexperience, but our own interests can
also blind us to a developing crisis. The
local Wuhan government officials had
incentivse to not recognize the crisis.
They did not want to reveal an undesirable event to the central government in
Beijing, and they did not want to have to
deal with a problem that might disrupt
their upcoming political provincial
meeting.
The fourth stage in crisis management deals with the response. Crises
involve an initial event, followed by a
response. Curiously, the response often
becomes a larger crisis than the original
event. Once a crisis has been identified,
the public looks to leaders and responsible
organizations to contain it. Responding to
a crisis requires sound judgment, the
mobilization of response organizations,
and persuasive communications.
We can debate whether China
should have recognized the crisis sooner
and shared information with the world
earlier, but we have to marvel at the
aggressive action China took to contain
the crisis. It imposed sheltering in place,
built hospitals in 10 days, ramped up
testing, and quarantined anyone testing
positive or even exposed to the virus
(Wang et al. 2020). It extended its
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lockdown to virtually the entire country
at great cost to its economy. Tamping
down the contagion in China did not rely
solely on a top-down approach but also
relied on the strong social solidarity of the
Chinese people. And it does not appear
to depend solely on an authoritarian
government because a number of democratic societies such as South Korea,
Germany, Australia, New Zealand, and
Taiwan also successfully controlled the
virus through vigorous testing, tracing,
and quarantining (Baker et al. 2020;
Summers et al. 2020). We saw in subsequent waves of the virus, however,
compliance was more challenging in
these democratic societies.
The missteps in the Trump administration’s response can be traced to president’s anti-establishment populism,
which eschewed international relations,
mistrusted science, disregarded facts and
truth telling, suspected government officials of disloyalty, and displayed a
tendency to divide rather than unite the
country. These biases conspired against
the administration’s approach for successfully managing the pandemic (Klain
2020). The steps required to manage the
pandemic included mobilizing an international response, respecting science,
relying on government agencies to
prepare and execute plans, communicating truthfully with transparency, and
promoting social trust to encourage the
public to take precautions to prevent the
spread of the virus in the absence of a
vaccine.
The administration’s failure to plan
began as early as the presidential transition when the Obama administration
provided the incoming Trump administration with a table-top pandemic exercise accompanied by a detailed planning
document, which highlighted the threat
of a pandemic as a potential high-impact

event. Unfortunately, the high turnover
in the Trump administration left few
attendees from that transition exercise
still in government three years later. The
Trump administration’s $1.35 billion cut
to the Pandemic Public Health Fund at
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
as well as the elimination of the National
Security Council’s office of pandemic
response and the removal of the CDC
epidemiologists in Beijing also contributed to the federal government’s early
missteps (Kirchhoff 2020).
Press reports indicated President
Trump rebuffed many efforts from his
own administration to get him to focus
on the possibility of a pandemic after the
outbreak in China. The president substituted his own judgment for that of the
experts, including members of his administration. The administration not only
failed to prepare but also waged a highstakes gamble contrary to the advice of
the medical community by assuring the
public the situation was under control
when it was not. This misjudgment on
COVID-19 had immediate deadly
consequences.
On January 31, 2020, President
Trump did take action by blocking all
foreigners from coming to the United
States from China. As an isolated action,
however, it assumed that only Chinese
nationals might spread the virus.
Meanwhile, 40,000 people who were not
Chinese nationals traveled from China to
the United States in the 60 days after the
ban without any systematic program to
test, trace, and quarantine, and many
others came into the country possibly
with COVID-19 from other hotspot
countries (Eder et al. 2020)
On March 11, 2020, the president
acted again by imposing a travel ban on
European travelers. This action, however,
may have accelerated the spread of
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COVID-19 in the United States as thousands of US citizens and others overwhelmed airports rushing back to the US
before the ban went into effect (Saunders
2020). The rush created an ideal breeding
environment for the virus. Bans work
only if they are accompanied by rigorous
testing, tracing, and quarantining. And
they certainly work best if they block all
travelers without giving advanced warnings that create a rush to travel before the
effective date.
Finally, on March 13, 2020, the
president declared a national emergency.
State governors took actions to protect
the public (Savage 2020). Since the virus
had spread more rapidly to some cities
and states, it made sense for the governors
to take actions appropriate to their states.
Perhaps political considerations influenced decision-making because coincidently the initial spread took place in the
so-called blue states of Washington,
California, New York, and southern New
England. Without a coordinated federal
response, however, governors had to
compete with each other for PPE, ventilators, and other necessary supplies. The
federal government decided not to play a
central role in the coordination even
though only it could compel companies
to produce vital equipment.
Between March 19 and March 25,
2020, as the number of COVID-19 cases
rose precipitously, governors in 20 states
shut down their economies and ordered
residents to shelter in place. During the
following week, an additional 20 states
took the same action (Mervosh 2020).
In hindsight, it’s clear that the early
hotspots such as New York City should
have closed sooner. Columbia University’s
model showed that 54,000 deaths might
have been prevented if certain states had
closed two weeks earlier (Togoh 2020)—a
significant misstep. Just two weeks before

New York City shutdown, its mayor rode
a crowded subway encouraging people to
go about their normal business because
there was nothing to fear, an example of
the difficulty in recognizing a crisis event
and the reluctance to take bold action in
the early stages before the public perceives
the problem.
The president, the governors, and
mayors in hotspots such as New York
were not the only ones to make missteps.
The CDC bungled the roll-out of the
testing program, which prevented the
country from identifying those infected
before the infection rate escalated (Patel
2020). Without early testing, there was
no possibility of quarantining and tracing.
And the medical community initially sent
mixed messages on masks. While China
and much of Asia all adopted masks as a
preventive measure, the US Surgeon
General tweeted on February 29, 2020,
“seriously people, STOP BUYING
MASKS” (Balluck 2020).
In examining missteps, it is only fair
to point to these steps that mitigated the
crisis, as well. On March 27, 2020, as the
country closed down, the President and
Congress quickly enacted legislation to
provide more than two trillion dollars for
businesses, hospitals, and workers as the
economy slid into an induced coma
(Cochrane and Stolberg 2020). The
Federal Reserve also took unprecedented
action to shore up the financial markets
(Cheng et al. 2020). Despite a hostile
attitude toward science, the president
supported the development of a vaccine,
another positive step toward ending the
pandemic. The promise of a vaccine
under development on an accelerated
path became the backbone of his strategy
for dealing with the pandemic. To curb
the spread of the virus prior to the availability of a reliable vaccine, the country
needed a program of testing, tracing, and
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quarantining, but it stumbled in the
execution of these methods.
CRISIS COMMUNICATION

C

risis management calls not only for
decisive actions but also for effective
communication—keeping the public
informed, explaining the rationale for
decisions, and persuading the public to
do things to keep themselves and others
safe. In a pandemic, these safety measures
include wearing masks, washing hands,
maintaining social distance, and sheltering in place. These actions may be
more in the interests of our fellow citizens than of ourselves, which is why it is
critical to communicate these messages
with the moral authority of society’s
leaders.
This type of crisis communication,
however, is particularly challenging in the
United States, with our exaggerated sense
of individual freedom and our lessdeveloped sense of social responsibility.
Our highly polarized society with low
social trust exacerbated the communication challenge. The task of shaping the
narrative is critical. President Trump used
a daily news conference and Twitter,
which gave him direct access to millions,
but he never developed a consistent
narrative. He minimized the virus,
compared it to the flu, urged the country
to ignore it, assured the public it was
under control, and blamed China. At
times he said it was serious but also that
it was not so bad (Paz 2020).
The expected crisis communication
strategy of a national leader is to bring
people together, express empathy for
those suffering, console the bereaved,
support frontline responders, and build
common bonds to give the community a
sense of shared sacrifice. In crisis management, that strategy is a time-honored best
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practice. The president’s surprising departure from that norm only served to sow
seeds of division in the country.
The sheltering-in-place policy
imposed by governors flattened the curve
in many states, but it came at big cost to
the economy. The strategy made sense
only as a short-term measure to reduce
hospitalizations, secure necessary medical
supplies, and alert the public to the seriousness of the pandemic and the urgency
to change behavior. President Trump
came to oppose the policy because, as he
put it, “the cure may be worse than the
disease” (Haberman and Sanger 2020).
The president expressed the legitimate
concern that the longer the economy
remained closed, the more businesses and
jobs might be lost for good (Tankersley
2020).
In prioritizing opening the economy
while dismissing concern for health, the
president implicitly advocated something
closer to the herd immunity strategy
adopted by Sweden (Goodman 2020).
Herd immunity requires the majority of a
population to have been exposed to the
virus. But even with rapid spread of the
virus, the United States was a long way
from herd immunity. Meanwhile, the
president portrayed a sharp division
between opening the economy and
implementing health precautions rather
than portraying them as complementary.
President Trump pressured governors
to open their states to get the economy
going even as case numbers increased
(Colvin et al. 2020). He minimized the
risk of the contagion by shunning the use
of face masks and turning the mask-free
face into a symbol of defiance. As the
virus spread into rural regions in the
South, Midwest, and West, the president’s
decision to not serve as a role model for
healthy behavior proved to be his most
significant misstep. He lost an
76

opportunity to educate the public on the
quickest way to restore the economy prior
to a vaccine by adopting safe practices.
Without implementing widespread
safety precautions, the United States,
with only 4 percent of the world’s population, found itself with 25 percent of the
world’s COVID-19 cases and more than
20 percent of the deaths in the first year
of the pandemic (Andrew 2020). In a
pandemic that disproportionately
affected the elderly, those with underlying health conditions, the poor, and
minorities, such an approach increased
the risk to the most vulnerable members
of the community.
ENDING THE CRISIS AND
RETURNING TO NORMAL

T

his brings us to the fifth stage in crisis
management—returning society to
normal. After six or seven weeks of
shutdown, pressure began to mount to
open the economy, not only from the
president but also from those in regions
with low infection levels and those with
businesses and jobs that suffered with a
shelter-in-place policy. With the national
unemployment rate at 15 percent, 40
million workers filing for unemployment insurance, and many businesses
unable to survive a prolonged shutdown
(Flitter 2020), there was growing recognition that the country had to find a
way to open back up. But without a
comprehensive program to test, trace,
and quarantine or widespread adoption
of a vaccine or antibody therapy, what
did it mean for the society to return to
normal? Businesses wondered whether
they should risk remaining closed and
going bankrupt or opening and going
bankrupt if they were sued by someone
who got sick on their premises (Eisenberg
2020).

The early lockdown in many rural
regions may have been a misstep by the
governors, but the return to normal in
regions with rising infections, inadequate
testing, and no plan to take precautions
to protect the public exacerbated the
spread of the virus in many states.
MAINE’S PANDEMIC RESPONSE

W

hile the federal government failed
to plan, recognize, and respond
effectively to the pandemic, Maine, along
with several other states such as Vermont
and New Mexico, managed the crisis
with relative success—although arguably
not without missteps. In March 2020,
Maine Governor Janet Mills closed the
state and made the health and safety
of the population her top priority.
Mills’s response contrasted sharply with
Trump’s. While President Trump sidelined his medical experts and put Vice
President Pence in charge of the administration’s pandemic response, Governor
Mills deferred to Maine CDC Director
Dr. Nirav Shah and her health experts to
manage the crisis.
Governor Mills and Dr. Shah
communicated consistently and frequently
with the media and the public. They
asked for cooperation in taking safety
precautions to halt the spread of the
disease. In making public health her top
priority, the governor projected an image
of a healer, a unifier, and a concerned
leader trying to protect the health of all
Mainers, even those who opposed her
policies. The governor’s aggressive steps to
halt the spread of the virus bolstered the
state’s reputation as a safe place, which
contributed to the boom in tourists
visiting Maine when the state opened
back up (McGuire 2021)
In the early days of the pandemic,
while COVID-19 rapidly spread from
hotspots such as New York City and into
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New Jersey, Connecticut, and
Massachusetts, it barely reached the
southern-most parts of Maine. The
precautionary statewide lockdown in
March 2020 was poorly received in the
northern Maine where there were virtually no COVID-19 cases. The reaction
quickly became an ideological dispute
with northern Mainers, a region with
many Trump supporters who saw the
governor’s policies as a heavy-handed
attack on their freedom and livelihoods.
In turning the pandemic response
over to medical experts in the early stage
of the pandemic, the state may not have
achieved a balance between protecting
the public’s health and protecting the
state’s economy (Ip 2020). In hindsight,
the early statewide closures may have
been an overreach—arguably too protective of health and too insensitive to the
economic and social consequences of a
lengthy lockdown. As the pandemic
continued, concerns over health and the
economy came into greater balance as the
entire society learned how to keep the
economy going by taking measures to
safely distance, wash hands, wear masks,
and limit indoor gatherings.
Most Mainers were grateful to
Governor Mills and Dr. Shah for putting
public health first and basing decisions on
science. Decisions were justified by reference to science, but the scientific community’s understanding of COVID-19
evolved over time. Science alone did not
provide definitive policy options, which
allowed for differences of opinion even
among those willing to follow the science.
For instance, the decision to require
out-of-state visitors from certain states to
quarantine for 14 days or take a COVID
test 72 hours before arriving in Maine
served largely to discourage people from
coming to Maine. The retail and hospitality industries saw this policy as arbitrary

and unenforceable and complained that
state policy was largely based on a general
perception of risk rather than specific
science-based metrics that could have
provided clear targets and protocols. It
was also hard to find the scientific basis
behind the 9:00 pm curfew on restaurants,
as if eating at 8:00 pm was somehow safer
than eating an hour later. The policy
mostly seemed designed to discourage
people from going to restaurants. These
types of decisions were driven as much by
political calculations as by any scientific
rationale as a way to extend the lockdown
in the face of stiff opposition.
Preventing the spread of the virus
was not without considerable trade-offs.
Reducing one societal risk increased
several other risks. The unforeseen consequences of an aggressive prevention
policy included more than the loss of
revenue to a shuttered business or the
forfeit of wages to idled employees. The
loss of work and social interaction
inflicted psychological harm on those
affected. Business owners and their
employees lost more than just money;
they also lost a sense of identity, purpose,
and well-being. The isolated elderly
suffered from loneliness. Children were
deprived of not only attending school but
also of developing important relationships with teachers and friends during a
formative time of their lives. The aggressive measures proved effective in halting
the spread of the virus, but it was achieved
at a high social cost (Allen 2020).
The Trump administration and the
Mills administration took opposite
approaches to the pandemic. Those
choices in the early stages of the pandemic
divided the country and the state and
exacerbated an already polarized society.
Over time, both the federal and state
governments have learned to take
measures to maintain both public health
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and a vibrant economy. But those early
decisions framed the partisan divide.
Despite facing a common enemy in
COVID-19, the country and the state
never came together on a course of action
to confront the deadly disease.
ASSESSING THE CRISIS
RESPONSE

T

he conclusion of a crisis comes
with an assessment of the success
or failure of efforts to bring the crisis
to an end with the least possible harm.
We often assess crises and the actions
of leaders through ideological lenses.
Those who previously had negative
views of China more readily blamed
that country. Attitudes about the Trump
administration’s preparation and response
were colored by perception of President
Trump prior to the crisis. Commissions
are often established to perform these
assessments such as the 9-11 Commission
or the National Commission on the
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling. With such accounting
comes the inevitable blame or praise for
leaders, organizations, and even countries
that failed or succeeded in handling the
crisis.
China has been praised for its effective response to the COVID-19 outbreak
but blamed for the virus’s origin. The
debate over the origination—whether the
coronavirus spread from an animal in a
wet market or a leak from the Wuhan
Institute of Virology—illustrates the politics of crisis management and how crises
are refracted by the interests of participants. The scientific community initially
dismissed the leak theory, which had
been advocated by anti-Chinese politicians with little evidence. But whatever
the truth of the virus’s origin, both the
advocacy of the leak theory without
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evidence and the dismissal of it without
investigation demonstrated how the
interests of the participants colored their
positions on crisis events. While we will
likely never know with certainty the
origin of the virus, this example shows
how political interests inhibit an independent inquiry to assess the cause and
the management of the crises.
In the United States, future assessments will likely focus on the failure of
the federal and state governments to lead,
organize supplies to protect health
workers, and provide adequate and timely
testing, tracing, and quarantining. The
federal government under President
Trump may receive credit for its initiative
to develop a vaccine, but the successful
development may be overshadowed by
poor implementation and widespread
vaccine skepticism. The assessment of the
federal government’s response under
Presidents Trump and Biden and the
response of each of the 50 states will have
to wait until the pandemic is over. The
assessment will likely focus on how a
public health crisis became entangled
with a cultural political issue that pitted
personal freedom against community
safety.
It is a notable irony that, in the
midst of a trade war between the two
largest economies in the world, a
pandemic began in China and had a
devastating effect in the United States. It
is also telling that the Wuhan city officials
and the Trump administration shared the
same missteps in not recognizing the
crisis and not taking early action. Both
Wuhan officials and the Trump administration failed to be transparent with the
public, which is a fundamental rule of
crisis management: tell the public what
you know and what you don’t know, do it
in the early stage of the crisis, and keep
doing it until the crisis has ended. Both
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expressed optimism and provided assurances without evidence to back up their
claims. The US administration’s failure
may be even more egregious in that it had
the advantage of the early warning of the
outbreak in China and had seen it spread
to other countries.
It is likely that the leaders of China,
Italy, Brazil, the United Kingdom, and
the United States will suffer from a harsh
assessment for their missteps in preventing,
preparing for, and managing the crisis. In
contrast the leaders of Germany, Norway,
Finland, Iceland, Taiwan, and New
Zealand have received praise for their
early decisive action in containing the
spread of the coronavirus in their countries. Is it just coincidence that the leaders
being blamed and who have tried to shift
the blame to others were men and those
who took early action were women? Just
like these national-level women leaders,
Maine’s Governor Mills along with New
Mexico’s Governor Grisham have led
their states with a strong focus on public
health. Any assessment will have to
grapple with the way men are socialized
into leadership that may have created a
blind spot in dealing with health-related
crises. The alpha-male leadership model
may convince leaders they can bend
reality to their will, but it may be the
wrong approach in dealing with a
pandemic. Women leaders appear to have
exhibited more respect for the power of
the virus, more humility in their ability to
control it, and more interest in protecting
their people while taking a longer view on
the economy.
LESSONS LEARNED

T

he sixth and final stage of crisis
management calls for an honest
assessment of the lessons learned and the
steps that should be taken to prevent and

plan for the next pandemic. So, what are
the lessons we will have learned from this
pandemic?
• Will we engage in pandemic
planning, scenario drills, stockpiling medical equipment, and
strengthening our public health
system?
• Will we address the patchwork
public health and medical insurance system in the country?
• Will we move away from efficiency and adopt a more redundant approach to inventory in
our critical healthcare supply
chain?
• Will we recognize that off-shoring
the manufacture of PPE and
generic medicines leaves us
vulnerable in a pandemic?
• Will we address the absence of a
safety net for many in our society
who are ill-equipped to deal with
such a disruption in their lives?
• Will we recognize the need for
greater global cooperation to stop
or prevent pandemics in every
country (especially in the poorest
countries without the resources
to contain a pandemic on their
own) because cooperation is in
our self-interest and the current
every-country-for-itself approach
to pandemic preparedness and
response is self-defeating?
The hope is that the pandemic wakes
us to the realization that we have to
resolve the underlying issues that have
caused so much suffering during this
crisis. Solutions that seemed radical prior
to the pandemic may be seen as more
reasonable in its aftermath. This pandemic
may be seen as a warning sign that spurs
us to address fundamental societal issues
and to prepare for future pandemics and
other crises.
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